Motorola Inc.'s Timbuktu Pro is a remote control software that allows remote access to a computer's desktop. It is available for Mac OS X and Windows systems and provides integration with Skype and SSH. More information is available on Motorola's web site at the following URL.
Remote exploitation of a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Motorola Inc.'s Timbuktu Pro could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
Timbuktu fails to properly handle user-supplied data passed through a named pipe session. When the PlughNTCommand named pipe receives an overly large character string, a buffer overflow will occur resulting in arbitrary code execution.
Exploitation of this issue allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. An attacker would need to locate a system running the Timbuktu Pro software. Upon finding a system that is running the vulnerable software, the attacker would check for the availability of the PlughNTCommand named pipe. If the named pipe is available, the attacker can connect and create a session without authenticating. The attacker can then send malformed data to the Timbuktu Pro process, resulting in arbitrary code execution with elevated privileges.
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Timbuktu Pro version 8.6.5. Previous versions may also be affected.
A named pipe filter can be applied to the registry. Named pipe filtering can be done in two ways dynamic filtering and white listing. Microsoft provides further details about how to implement this workaround.
Named Pipe Filter workaround: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/925890
Motorola Inc. has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more information, consult their advisory at the following URLs:
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2009-1394 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems.
07/09/2008 - Initial Contact
07/14/2008 - Initial vendor response
09/15/2008 - Vendor update received
03/12/2009 - Vendor status requested
03/12/2009 - Vendor update received
04/24/2009 - Vendor status requested
04/24/2009 - Tentative disclosure set to May 13
06/25/2009 - Coordinated Public Disclosure
This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Rubén Santamarta of reversemode.com.
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