The srsexec utility is part of the SRS Proxy Core package that is available with Solaris 10. This package is used to monitor the performance of clients running Solaris from a centralized administrative console. This software would be installed on all of the client machines being monitored and is set-uid root by default. More information is available at the vendor's site.
Local exploitation of a format string vulnerability in the srsexec binary, optionally included in Sun Microsystems Inc.'s Solaris 10, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.
The vulnerability exists since attacker supplied data is passed directly to the syslog() function as the format string. This allows an attacker to overwrite arbitrary memory with arbitrary data, and can result in the execution of arbitrary code with root privileges.
Exploitation results in the execution of arbitrary code with root privileges. In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to execute the set-uid root binary.
The SRS Proxy Core package is not installed by default, but it is a common application.
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Solaris 10 with the SUNWsrspx package installed. In order to determine if this package is installed, an administrator can execute the following command:
If this command returns 'ERROR: information for "SUNWsrspx" was not found', then the system does not have the affected package installed and is not vulnerable.
To prevent exploitation of this vulnerability, remove the set-uid bit from the srsexec binary as shown below.
# chmod -s /opt/SUNWsrspx/bin/srsexec
Sun Microsystems has addressed this vulnerability by releasing patches. For more information, consult Sun Alert 103119 at the following URL.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2007-3880 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems.
07/18/2007 Initial vendor notification
07/18/2007 Initial vendor response
11/02/2007 Coordinated public disclosure
This vulnerability was discovered by Sean Larsson of VeriSign iDefense Labs.
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Copyright © 2007 Verisign, Inc.
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