IBM Corp.'s DB2 Universal Database product is a large database server product commonly used for high end databases. For more information, visit the following URL.
Local exploitation of multiple untrusted search path vulnerabilities in IBM Corp.'s DB2 Universal Database could allow attackers to elevate privileges to the superuser.
These vulnerabilities exist due to the execution of binaries or loading of libraries within untrusted paths. In each case, the path to a binary or library is generated based on an environment variable that is under attacker control. Additionally, the files to be executed or loaded are located in a directory under attacker control.
Exploitation allows local attackers to gain root privileges.
In cases where programs are executed, an attacker need only create a specially crafted environment and file structure. In cases where a library is loaded, creating a library containing a specially crafted initialization section is sufficient.
In order to exploit some of these vulnerabilities, the attacker must be a member of the "db2grp1" or a group corresponding with an installed DB2 instance.
iDefense confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version 9.1 Fix Pack 2 of IBM Corp.'s DB2 Universal Database installed on a Linux system. All prior versions, as well as builds for other UNIX-based operating systems, are suspected to be vulnerable.
Setting more strict permissions on the DB2 instance directory can help mitigate some of these vulnerabilities. Removing the setuid-bit from all programs included with DB2 can also help mitigate exposure. Note, these configuration changes have not been thoroughly tested and may cause adverse behavior.
IBM Corp. has addressed this vulnerability by releasing V9 Fix Pack 3 and version V8 FixPak 15 of its Universal Database product. More information can be found at the following URLs.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2007-4275 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems.
03/23/2007 Initial vendor notification
03/23/2007 Initial vendor response
08/16/2007 Coordinated public disclosure
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
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