The srsexec utility is part of the SRS Proxy Core package that is available with Solaris 10. It is installed setuid root by default. For more information about this software, visit the following URL.
Local exploitation of a design error vulnerability in the srsexec binary optionally included in Sun Microsystems Inc., Solaris 10 allows attackers to gain access to sensitive information, such as the root password hash.
The vulnerability specifically exists because of a failure to drop permissions or check the permissions on the file specified for the target file. If a user specified verify only mode (-v) as well as debug mode (-d), and specified a protected file such as /etc/shadow, srsexec will display the first line of /etc/shadow in the debug messages. The following demonstrates a sample exploitation session:
$ /opt/SUNWsrspx/bin/srsexec -dvb /etc/shadow OWNED verify_binary(OWNED) srsexec: binary_name: OWNED srsexec: name_buf: OWNED_______________ binaries file line: root:omhyabndnAtNw:6 binaries file line: :6445:::::: smmsp:NP Security verification failed for binary: OWNED see SYSLOG(/var/adm/messages) for errors
Exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to gain access to the root password hash or other sensitive information.
In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have local user access to the system.
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Solaris 10 with the SUNWsrspx package installed. In order to determine if this package is installed, an administrator can execute the following command:
# pkginfo SUNWsrspx
If this command returns 'ERROR: information for "SUNWsrspx" was not found', then the system does not have the affected package installed and is not vulnerable.
Remove the setuid bit from the srsexec binary:
# chmod -s /opt/SUNWsrspx/bin/srsexec
Sun Microsystems has addressed this vulnerability with a patch release. For more information, consult Sun Alert ID 102891 at the following URL.
A Mitre Corp. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number has not been assigned yet.
11/07/2006 Initial vendor notification
11/10/2006 Initial vendor response
05/10/2007 Coordinated public disclosure
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
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