AppleTalk, a set of networking protocols developed by Apple, was originally implemented on early Mac operating systems. Although it is a legacy protocol, it is still supported on the latest version of Mac OS X. AppleTalk is compiled into the default kernel, but must be turned on in order to be used. More information can be found at the following URL.
Local exploitation of a stack based buffer overflow in Apple Inc.'s OS X may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in kernel context.
The vulnerability exists within the function responsible for adding an AppleTalk zone to an interface's routing table. A zone can be thought of as something similar to a Windows Domain.
When copying the user provided zone information into a fixed size stack buffer, the kernel uses a user provided length as the number of bytes to copy into the destination buffer. This results in an exploitable stack buffer overflow in the kernel.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will result in the execution of arbitrary code in kernel context. Unsuccessful attempts will likely crash the system.
In order to exploit this vulnerability, the system needs to have AppleTalk configured in routing mode. This is not enabled by default. It would likely be enabled on a Mac system running on a network with legacy Mac hosts.
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Mac OS X 10.4.10, Workstation and Server editions. Previous versions may also be affected.
To determine if AppleTalk is running, the following command can be executed on the command line.
$ appletalk -s
Disabling AppleTalk will prevent exploitation of this vulnerability. Executing the following command will disable AppleTalk if it is enabled.
# appletalk -d
Apple addressed this vulnerability within their Mac OS X 2007-008 security update. More information is available at the following URL.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2007-4267 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems.
08/08/2007 Initial vendor notification
08/09/2007 Initial vendor response
11/14/2007 Coordinated public disclosure
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
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Copyright © 2007 Verisign, Inc.
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