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SAP MaxDB dbmsrv Untrusted Execution Path Vulnerability

30.07.08

BACKGROUND

SAP's MaxDB is a database software product. MaxDB was released as open source from version 7.5 up to version 7.6.00. Later versions are no longer open source but are available for download from the SAP SDN website (sdn.sap.com) as a community edition with free community support for public use beyond the scope of SAP applications. The "dbmsrv" program is set-uid "sdb", set-gid "sdba", and installed by default. For more information, visit the product's website at the following URL.

https://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/maxdb

DESCRIPTION

Local exploitation of an untrusted path vulnerability in the "dbmsrv" program, as distributed with SAP AG's MaxDB, allow attackers to elevate privileges to that of the "sdb" user.

When a local user runs the "dbmcli" program, the MaxDB executes a "dbmsrv" process on the user's behalf. The "dbmsrv" process, which is responsible for executing user commands, runs as the user "sdb" with group "sdba".

This vulnerability exists due to improper sanitization of the "PATH" environment variable. By prefixing the "PATH" environment variable with a path under the attacker control, one is able to execute arbitrary code with "sdb:sdba" privileges.

ANALYSIS

Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with privileges of the database owner, usually "sdb". To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to create executables on the system.

DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in SAP MaxDB version 7.6.03.15 on Linux. Other versions may also be vulnerable.

WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workaround for this issue.

VENDOR RESPONSE

SAP AG has addressed this vulnerability by releasing a new version of MaxDB. For more information, consult SAP note 1178438.

CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2008-1810 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems.

DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

03/27/2008 Initial vendor notification
04/01/2008 Initial vendor response
07/30/2008 Coordinated public disclosure

CREDIT

The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.

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LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 Verisign, Inc.

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Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.